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THE VIOLENT BEAR IT AWAY 
EMMETT TILL & THE MODERNIZATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
MISSISSIPPI 
 
 
ANDERS WALKER∗
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Few racially motivated crimes have left a more lasting imprint on 
American memory than the death of Emmett Till.  Yet, even as 
Till’s murder in Mississippi in 1955 has come to be remembered as 
a catalyst for the civil rights movement, it contributed to something 
else as well.  Precisely because it came on the heels of the Supreme 
Court’s 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, Till’s death 
convinced Mississippi Governor James P. Coleman that certain 
aspects of the state’s handling of racial matters had to change.  
Afraid that popular outrage over racial violence might encourage 
federal intervention in the region, Coleman removed power from 
local sheriffs, expanded state police, and modernized the state’s 
criminal justice apparatus in order to reduce the chance of further 
racial violence in the state.  Though his results proved mixed, 
many of Coleman’s reforms lived on, contributing to the end of 
public torture and lynching as an accepted mode of punishment in 
the state.  This article discusses those changes, suggesting that they 
not only influenced the fight for civil rights, but encouraged the 
modernization of criminal justice in the South.  
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They tortured him and did some evil things too evil to 
repeat. There was screaming sounds inside the barn, 
there was laughing sounds out on the street.1
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Sometime during the summer of 1955, Emmett Till left the 
bustling metropolis of Chicago for the quiet pastoral of the 
Mississippi Delta.  Till’s mother had arranged for her son to spend 
time with his uncle, Moses Wright, who lived in a small town 
named Money, not far from the sleepy oak-lined streets of 
Greenwood.  Only fourteen, Till knew little of Mississippi’s past, 
nor of its strict code of racial conduct, a code that was enforced 
both legally through an elaborate system of statutory prohibitions 
on interracial contact and extra-legally, through vigilante action.  
Till’s unfamiliarity with local norms made him bold enough to do 
the unthinkable: to try to impress a cadre of local youths by 
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1 Bob Dylan, “The Death of Emmett Till” (1963). 
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approaching a white woman and, as that woman later testified in 
court, propositioning her.2
Retribution proved swift.  Not long after Till approached 
Carolyn Bryant, her husband Roy Bryant and his half brother, J.W. 
Milam knocked on the door of Moses Wright’s house, asking for 
the boy.  Brandishing arms, Milam and Bryant seized Till, drove 
him to a remote location near the Tallahatchie River, and in an 
attempt to get what they later described as an apology, tortured 
him.3  As far as authorities could tell from Till’s body, later found 
floating in the river, the torture session lasted for hours, as Milam 
and Bryant alternately punched, pistol-whipped, shot and 
eventually drowned the boy, tying him to a two-hundred pound 
cotton gin fan with barbed wire.4
Though the torture and murder took place outside of the 
public eye, the savagery of the crime attracted national attention 
when Till’s mother Mamie Bradley ordered the body brought back 
to Chicago.5  Once there, Bradley left her son’s casket open in a 
public wake, attracting thousands of viewers.6  Charles Diggs, a 
black congressman from Detroit, later explained how a picture of 
Till’s partly decomposed, mangled corpse, reprinted in Jet 
magazine, turned the incident into a national scandal.7  “I think 
that was probably one of the greatest media products in the last 
forty or fifty years,” recounted Diggs, “because that picture 
stimulated a lot of interest and a lot of anger on the part of blacks 
all over the country.”8
While the anger generated by Till’s murder is often cited as 
a catalyst for the civil rights movement, it sparked something else 
as well.9 Precisely because it came on the heels of the Supreme 
Court’s 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, Till’s death 
                                                 
2 Some claimed that Till whistled at Carolyn Bryant.  Others, including Carolyn 
herself claimed that he entered her store and propositioned her. STEPHEN J. 
WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL (1988).  
Recent evidence suggests that Till acted on a dare, attempting to impress his 
peers by approaching a white woman. THE LYNCHING OF EMMETT TILL: A 
DOCUMENTARY NARRATIVE, (Christopher Metress, ed. 2002). Curtis Jones’s 
interview for “Eyes on the Prize,” reprinted in VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL 
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S TO THE 1980S 3 
(Henry Hampton, Steve Fayer, Sarah Flynn, eds., 1990).   
3 William Bradford Huie, “Approved Killing in Mississippi,” LOOK, Jan. 1956. 
4 Id.  
5 Till’s wake is described in “Bury Slain Boy,” CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 7, 1955, 
5.   
6 Id.  
7 Charles Diggs interview for “Eyes on the Prize” television series, reprinted in 
VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
FROM THE 1950S TO THE 1980S, 7 (Henry Hampton, Steve Fayer, Sarah Flynn, 
eds. 1990).   
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
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convinced Mississippi Governor James P. Coleman that certain 
aspects of the state’s handling of racial matters had to change.  
Afraid that popular outrage over racial violence might encourage 
federal intervention in the region, Coleman removed power from 
local sheriffs, expanded state police, and modernized the state’s 
criminal justice apparatus in order to reduce the chance of further 
racial violence in the state.  Though his results proved mixed, 
many of Coleman’s reforms lived on, contributing to the end of 
public torture and lynching as an accepted mode of punishment in 
the state.  This article discusses those changes, repositioning Till’s 
murder, and Brown, in the historical narrative of the time, 
suggesting that they not only contributed to the fight for civil 
rights, but the modernization of criminal justice in the South. 
While legal historians have shown that civil rights triggered 
an explosion of extremism in the South, Coleman’s response to 
Till suggests that the struggle for racial equality did something else 
as well.10  It pushed the South to centralize authority, rein in local 
officials, improve the administration of justice and adopt a less 
publicly violent stance towards blacks.  Long decried for its 
toleration of the public torture and lynching of African Americans, 
Mississippi began to discourage any form of public racial violence 
in the aftermath of Till’s murder.  Though the torture of African 
Americans and civil rights activists did not stop, it assumed a more 
surreptitious role in political life. 
To show how this happened, this article will proceed in 
seven parts.  Part I will provide some background on race relations 
in Mississippi, using James P. (JP) Coleman’s political career as a 
lens through which to view the state’s struggle to deal with racial 
violence in the aftermath of World War II.  Part II will discuss the 
rise of extremism in the state immediately following Brown, and 
how Coleman resisted it.  Part III will discuss Coleman’s efforts to 
counter-balance the NAACP’s attempts to use the murder of 
Emmett Till along with crimes against other African Americans as 
a device for rallying popular support in favor of federal 
intervention in Mississippi as early as the 1950s.  Part IV will 
recover Coleman’s efforts at modernization, showing how he 
centralized state law enforcement power in an attempt to rein in 
local sheriffs and thwart extremists.  Part V will discuss Coleman’s 
use of black agents to reduce the chance of racial violence in the 
state. Part VI will discuss Coleman’s response to the lynching of 
Mack Charles Parker, an African American accused of raping a 
twenty-three year old white woman in 1959.  Part VII will show 
how even though Coleman was replaced by extremist Ross Barnett 
in 1960 he returned to the task of imposing a strict vision of anti-
                                                 
10 See, e.g. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 398-421 (2004).  
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extremist yet tough law enforcement in 1965, as a Lyndon Johnson 
appointee to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
Why recover the story of Mississippi’s response to Emmett 
Till now?  There are at least three reasons.  First, recent Supreme 
Court rulings have convinced many that Brown’s legacy amounts 
to little more than a call for ending overtly discriminatory laws.11  
Recovering Mississippi’s response to Till suggests that Brown also 
contributed to a dramatic transformation in southern criminal 
justice, a transformation that reduced local autonomy, increased 
centralized control, and modernized southern approaches to 
maintaining social order. 
Understanding the process of modernization that occurred 
in Mississippi in the 1950s helps to explain how states known for 
using the “spectacle” of violence to maintain social peace, moved 
towards a more “gentle way in punishment,” namely mass 
incarceration.12 As of 2007, Mississippi was fourth in the nation 
for the percentage of its population in prison, all of the highest 
percentages being in the South.13  While a disproportionate 
number of these prisoners are African Americans, the reforms 
begun by Coleman also facilitated control of whites.  This means 
that the push for freedom in the Deep South contributed not just to 
desegregation, but to the rise of a more centralized, intrusive police 
state. 
Mississippi’s turn away from localism towards a more 
intrusive state helps explain the final reason for recovering its 
response to Till.  From the beginning of the Civil War until the 
1950s, Mississippi relied not simply on legal regulations or law 
enforcement to preserve its racial hierarchy, but also on the private 
torture and murder of African Americans, a process known as 
lynching.14  Though never formally sanctioned by law, lynching 
                                                 
11 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 
U.S. ____ (2007). For responses, see Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston III, 
A Re-Analysis of the Legal, Political, and Social Landscape of Desegregation 
from Plessy v. Ferguson to Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District, 2007 BYU EDUC. & LAW J. 217 (2007); Goodwin Liu, Seattle 
and Louisville 95 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2007); Joseph O. Oluwole, Preston C. 
Greene III, Charter Schools: Racial-Balancing Provisions and Parents Involved 
61 ARK. L. REV. 1 (2008).  
12 I borrow the term “gentle punishment” from Michel Foucault, who tracks the 
decline of public torture in France during the eighteenth century.  During that 
time, France moved away from “the spectacle of the scaffold” and towards a 
more “gentle way in punishment.”  Mississippi’s official attitude towards 
lynching exhibited a similar path.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: 
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 32, 104 (Alan Sheridan, trans. 1977).  
13 PEW Center on the States, “One in 100: Behind Bars in 2008,” 34. 
14 Though lynching occurred during the antebellum period, it took on a “new 
significance” during and after the Civil War.  JACQUELYN DOWD HALL, REVOLT 
AGAINST CHIVALRY: JESSE DANIEL AMES AND THE WOMEN’S CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST LYNCHING 131 (1993); ARTHUR F. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF 
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was rarely interfered with by law enforcement.15  Precisely 
because lynching occurred in plain view, it acted as a type of 
public ritual, a “spectacle” aimed at disciplining the African 
American population while galvanizing the white.16  Critical to 
this spectacle was not simply the execution of black victims, but 
the torture of them, including the “marking of victims” and the 
punishment of them in “spectacular” ways, through for example 
dismemberment, burning, or hanging.17   
While Governor Coleman did not bring an absolute end to 
the spectacle of lynching, he did facilitate a larger transformation 
in punishment, shifting it from public spectacle to juridical 
obscurity.  No longer of use to public governance, torture became a 
more sporadic, surreptitious practice.  Precisely because of the 
public outrage at the manner in which Till had been mangled, 
future tortures had to be carried out in a way that left no trace.  For 
those alarmed at the apparent resurgence of torture in the Twenty-
First Century United States, recovering Coleman’s story helps cast 
new torture tactics like water-boarding and the horrors of Abu 
Ghraib in a new light, products not simply of an increased ferocity, 
but an increased attention, ironically, to civil rights.   
 
 
 
LESSONS FROM THE PAST 
 
Born on December 9, 1914, J.P. Coleman grew up on a 
farm in Mississippi’s hill country, a region known for an 
“unprecedented outbreak” of lynching in the 1890s.18 When 
Coleman was five, a second wave of lynching washed across the 
South, prompted by the return of black soldiers from World War 
I.19  Had Coleman not been influenced by his grandfather, he 
might have grown to view lynching as a natural part of the 
established social order, but the old Confederate soldier 
                                                                                                                                                 
LYNCHING (1933); CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, THE MANY FACES OF JUDGE 
LYNCH (2002). Lynching increased dramatically following the disfranchisement 
of African Americans in the 1890s.  See e.g. Terence Finnegan, Lynching and 
Political Power in Mississippi and South Carolina, in UNDER SENTENCE OF 
DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SOUTH 201-209 (Fitzhugh Brundage, ed., 1997). 
15 Laura J. Griffin, Paula Clark, and Joanne C. Sandberg, “Narrative and Event: 
Lynching and Historical Sociology,” in UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH, supra note 
11, at 33, 36. 
16 FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 9, at 32.  See also JACQUELYN DOWD 
HALL, REVOLT AGAINST CHIVALRY: JESSE DANIEL AMES AND THE WOMEN’S 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST LYNCHING 139 (1993).   
17 FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 9, at 34.  See also HALL, REVOLT, supra 
note 16.  
18 Finnegan, “Lynching and Political Power,” supra note 14, at 205.  
19 HALL, REVOLT, supra note 16, at 60.  
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encouraged the boy to read the Congressional Record, pointing 
him in a direction that would lead him to the heart of national 
politics.  Inspired by what he read, Coleman began to borrow law 
books from a district attorney in Ackerman named Aaron Lane 
Ford.  When Ford decided to run for a United States House seat in 
1934 he asked Coleman to go through the Record looking for 
information on his opponent Thomas Jefferson Busby.  Coleman 
ably compiled a notebook documenting Busby’s absences from 
particular votes, prompting Ford to invite him to take a job on his 
staff in Washington.20
Coleman’s move to the nation’s capitol, where he worked 
as Ford’s secretary by day and attended classes at the George 
Washington University School of Law by night proved 
enlightening.  For the next four years, he immersed himself in 
political life; listened to Supreme Court oral arguments, attended 
congressional debates and participated in the Little Congress, an 
organization of young clerks that met in the House Caucus room to 
introduce and debate mock bills.  During one debate, Coleman led 
a successful challenge to an initiative brought by a young Texan 
named Lyndon Baines Johnson, sparking a lifelong friendship 
between the two.  When Coleman ran for governor in 1955, 
Johnson contributed financially to his campaign and Coleman, in 
turn, supported Johnson for the presidency in 1956, 1960 and 
1964.21
From D.C., Mississippi looked different.  Coleman arrived 
just in time to see the election of Mississippi Senator Theodore 
Bilbo, a populist who became infamous for engaging in vitriolic 
displays of racial extremism on the Senate floor, attacking anti-
lynch laws and blasting African Americans for wanting to 
“mongrelize” the white race.22  Though Coleman admired certain 
elements of Bilbo’s political style, what he later termed his 
“common touch,” he came to believe that his virulent racism did 
Mississippi a “disservice.”23  Instead, Coleman thought that the 
South should project a positive image to the nation, striving to “be 
on good terms with the people from the North,” precisely so that it 
                                                 
20 J.P. Coleman, interview with Dr. Orley P. Caudill, Ackerman, Mississippi, 
November 12, 1981. Mississippi Oral History Program, University of Southern 
Mississippi. 
21 Coleman expressed his support for Johnson in the 1956 presidential race in a 
letter.  See Letter, J.P. Coleman to Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, September 24, 
1956, Folder: J.P. Coleman, Miss. Box 3, LBJA Famous Names, LBJ Library.  
For Coleman’s support of Johnson in subsequent elections, and for Johnson’s 
support of Coleman’s gubernatorial bid, see J.P. Coleman, interview with Orley 
Caudill.   
22 CHESTER M. MORGAN, REDNECK LIBERAL: THEODORE G. BILBO AND THE 
NEW DEAL (1985); ADWIN W. GREEN, THE MAN BILBO (1976).  
23 J.P. Coleman, interview with Orley B. Caudill, supra note 19.  
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could develop positive national relationships conducive to its own 
political interests.24
Coleman’s appreciation for national opinion was bolstered 
by southern history.  By the time he became governor in 1956, he 
had accumulated over four hundred books on the Civil War and 
reminded voters repeatedly of the “dark days of Reconstruction” 
when the federal government sent troops to occupy southern 
states.25  Conversely, he also reminded voters that the Supreme 
Court had once been an ally of the South during the decades 
following the Civil War, and could be again.26  In fact, Coleman 
even published an article on post-Civil War politics that coincided, 
in many ways, with his campaign to mount a legalist response to 
the Supreme Court in the 1950s.27  In it, he showed how 
Mississippi leaders in the 1890s had feared that defiance “would 
bring evils upon the state,” not least among them “adverse 
congressional legislation.”28   
Coleman confronted northern “evils” first hand after 
returning to Mississippi and serving as Attorney General.29  Not 
long after taking office, Coleman defended the death sentence of 
an alleged black rapist named Willie McGee.30  McGee, who was 
first convicted in 1945 for raping a white woman, became an 
international cause celebre when a left-leaning, northern based 
civil rights organization called the Civil Rights Congress (CRC) 
discovered that McGee had been having a consensual affair with 
his alleged victim.31  The CRC decided not only to take up the case 
                                                 
24 Coleman discussed Bilbo in his interview with Dr. Orley B. Caudill.  See J.P. 
Coleman, interview, Orley B. Caudill.  For coverage of the 1935 lynch law 
debates in Congress, see “Senate Holds Firm for Lynching Test: Southerners 
Plan to Adjourn and Thereby Sidetrack Bill,” N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1935, 20.  
25 J.P. Coleman, “Meeting the School Crisis: An Address by Attorney General 
J.P. Coleman,” delivered over the facilities of TV Station WLBT, Jackson, 
Mississippi, June 1, 1954.  
26 James P. Coleman, The Origin of the Constitution of 1890, XIX J. OF MISS. 
HIST.  (1957).  
27 Id.  
28 Coleman quoted these words, which were initially spoken by Judge Robert H. 
Thompson at a Mississippi Bar Association meeting in 1923, about the 1890 
Constitutional Convention in an article that he wrote for the Journal of 
Mississippi History.  See Coleman, supra note 26, at 73.  In that piece, Coleman 
also noted a turn to legalist evasion as a means of denying the black vote in 
1890.  Id., 87.  For more on legalist evasion surrounding black voting rights, see 
J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE 
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 
(1974).  
29 Cecil L. Sumners, THE GOVERNORS OF MISSISSIPPI 125-8 (1980). 
30 For Coleman’s role in the case, and before the Supreme Court, see M’Gee 
Execution Stayed by Court: High Bench Will Rule on New Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 16, 1951, 23. 
31 SARAH HART BROWN, STANDING AGAINST DRAGONS: THREE SOUTHERN 
LAWYERS IN AN ERA OF FEAR (1998), 89-114. 
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but to use it as a propaganda tool against the South, sending a full 
motorcade to Jackson in 1950.32  Thanks in part to the CRC, 
McGee gained outside representation from New York attorney and 
future congresswoman Bella Abzug, who battled J.P. Coleman all 
the way to the Supreme Court.33  Coleman’s eventual victory over 
Abzug before the nation’s highest tribunal reinforced his 
conviction that the Court could ultimately be made a southern ally 
even as it alerted him to the manner in which outside groups could 
use southern atrocities to fuel northern propaganda.34  The McGee 
case alone, for example, led to demonstrations in Chicago, Detroit, 
and New York, not to mention letters pleading for McGee’s release 
from political officials in countries as distant as China and the 
Soviet Union.35
Coleman’s experience securing the execution of Willie 
McGee, along with his early experiences in Washington, help 
explain his response to Till. Just as he had learned that racial 
extremism did not help Theodore Bilbo’s image nationally, so too 
did he fear that the reptilian violence of Till’s murder might 
jeopardize the state.  And, just as the McGee case generated 
unwanted northern publicity for Mississippi, so too did the 
acquittal of Milam and Bryant inflame the national press.  
Avoiding further bad press struck Coleman as crucial, particularly 
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling demanding 
desegregated schools in Brown.  Throughout his time as Governor, 
Coleman remained convinced that integration would only occur if 
northern power forced it.  In his opinion, desegregation was not a 
priority for Mississippi blacks but a radical northern goal, 
sponsored by left-wing, elitist groups who had little concern for 
average southern people.  Coleman’s battles with the CRC – an 
organization that had little if any tie to blacks in Mississippi – only 
reinforced this view.  To him, such groups obfuscated the fact that 
Brown was bad for both races, and that segregation was in fact a 
mutually beneficial arrangement.  “I am for segregation not 
because I hate Negroes,” he wrote one constituent in 1958, but 
“because I know from experience, as you do, that that it is for the 
best interest of both races.”36  To him, segregation was a 
“kindness” that made life “easier” for blacks by keeping them 
protected from white extremists, ultimately representing an 
                                                 
32 Mississippi Arrests 41 at Capitol as Willie McGee Plea is Studied, N. Y. 
TIMES, May 6, 1951, 1.   
33 M’Gee’s Fourth Plea Fails in High Court, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 1951, 20. 
34 Id.  
35 Group Joins in Fight for Execution Stay, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1950, 23; 1,000 
in Times Square Rally: ‘Save Willie McGee Group is Routed by Police, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 27, 1950, 32. 
36 J.P. Coleman to C.C. Walsh, April 10, 1958, Folder: “Citizens’ Council, 
1957-58,” Subgroup 5, Box 12, J.P. Coleman Correspondence, MDAH.  
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“implement of orderly, peaceable government.”37  Not only did it 
neutralize racial tension but segregation also allowed blacks to 
improve their lives free from white interference and control. 
Of course, implicit in such a view was an inability to see 
how segregation actually reinforced racial subordination.  For 
example, not only did Jim Crow laws separate whites and blacks in 
public spaces, but they also facilitated a remarkable disparity in 
resource allocation.  For blacks, public accommodations were not 
only set apart from whites, for example, but were often 
considerably inferior.  Black schools received less money, black 
neighborhoods received fewer public services, black hospitals were 
poorer, and black chances to rise out of poverty were blocked by 
obstacles to professional education, licensing, and voting.  
Coleman’s inability to see the potentially devastating effects of 
such barriers to black advancement reflected a deeper blindness 
that, while not vitriolic or violent, nevertheless made it impossible 
for him to understand black demands in Mississippi at the time.  
Indeed, Coleman was shocked when black leaders who had 
previously assured white officials that they opposed integration 
summoned the courage to denounce it during a meeting with 
Governor Hugh White in Jackson in July 1954.  Rather than take 
this as a sign of black frustration with segregation, however, 
Coleman took it as the reverse, evidence that groups like the CRC 
and NAACP were brainwashing black leaders.38
Confident that neither blacks nor whites wanted to send 
their children to integrated schools, Coleman campaigned for 
governor of Mississippi in 1955 on a platform of improving black 
education while preventing racial violence.  Committed to the 
notion that segregation was in fact good for both races, Coleman 
consciously avoided making negative statements about African 
Americans, and refused to endorse extremist white organizations 
like the Citizens’ Councils.  This was particularly remarkable 
given that the Councils had, since the summer of 1954, amassed 
considerable popular support in favor of outright defiance to the 
Supreme Court.39  Coleman was the only one of five gubernatorial 
candidates who did not to endorse the Councils, a move that he 
rationalized by emphasizing the importance of serving “all the 
                                                 
37 Id.   
38 J.P. Coleman, interview with Dr. Orley P. Caudill, supra note 20.  Mississippi 
Offers ‘Anything’ to Industry: Governor Coleman Heads a Hunting Party of 
Seven Here, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 1957, p. 29.  John Dittmer provides evidence 
substantiating Coleman’s suspicion that the NAACP pressured black leaders to 
endorse integration the night before they were scheduled to meet Governor 
Hugh White in July 1954.  See JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE 
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI 38-9 (1994).  
39 NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS 
IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S 126-149 (1969).  
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people” in the state.40  That he won the election suggests that 
Mississippi voters, who were overwhelmingly against 
desegregation, remained somewhat open to the idea that there 
might be more than one way of dealing with the Supreme Court, 
besides just defiance, as late as 1955.41
 
 
 
RESISTING “NULLIFICATION” 
 
One of the earliest indications that J.P. Coleman opposed 
defiance came only two weeks after the Brown ruling on June 1, 
1954.  Responding to concerns about the Supreme Court’s 
desegregation order, Coleman went on Mississippi television and 
proclaimed confidently that there was “plenty” the state could do 
to preserve segregated schools without resorting to extremism.42  
For example, Coleman noted that the Brown opinion substituted 
legal authority for “psychological and sociological” opinion and 
did not mention either how or when the South had to end 
segregation.43  This meant, Coleman argued, that the state of 
Mississippi could legally engage in a variety of measures to 
preserve segregation by manipulating “normal district boundaries” 
as well as assigning students to schools based on factors other than 
race, like “health,” “aptitude,” and “intelligence.”44
Convinced that “outside meddlers” had put “a few colored 
children” up to challenging segregation in the South, Coleman 
argued that black students by and large did not want to give up 
“their own schools,” “their own associates,” and “their own 
teachers” simply for the chance to integrate with whites.45  Not 
only would such a move be challenged by “well-settled social 
rules” in Mississippi, he argued, but it would also mark an ill-
considered rejection of substantive increases in black teachers’ 
salaries together with new, greatly improved black facilities in 
Mississippi.46  African Americans of “good judgment,” contended 
                                                 
40 Coleman reflected on his opposition to the Councils in a letter to a constituent 
in 1958.  See J.P. Coleman to C.C. Smith, April 10, 1958, Folder: “Citizens’ 
Council, 1957-1958,” Subgroup 5, Box 12, J.P. Coleman Correspondence, 
MDAH.   
41 Mississippi: The Six-Foot Wedge” TIME, March 4, 1957, 25.  
42 J.P. Coleman, “Meeting the School Crisis: An Address by Attorney General 
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Coleman would not exchange “a bird in the hand” for “nothing” in 
the bush.47
Coleman’s conviction that blacks lacked real commitment 
to integration contrasted starkly to the claims of many white 
extremists who argued vigorously that blacks were eager to 
integrate for the unlikely reason that they wanted to engage in 
interracial sex.48  Such claims, though preposterous, became the 
centerpiece of extremist positions like those held by Mississippi 
circuit judge Thomas Pickens Brady in 1954.  Brady, popularized 
the view that integration would lead to “amalgamation” in a speech 
delivered to a group of white citizens in Greenwood, Mississippi 
only a few weeks after Brown was decided.  Lamenting the impact 
that integration would have on southern society, Brady announced 
that black activists wanted to “get on the inter-marriage turnpikes” 
in pursuit of a “social program for amalgamation of the two races” 
that would “blow out the light” in the “white man’s brain.”49  Such 
claims, though absurd, played on longstanding fears of interracial 
sex in the South and inspired members of Brady’s audience to 
form the first Citizens’ Council in the summer of 1954.50
The Citizens’ Councils, a segregationist organization that 
eschewed violence but embraced economic coercion and legal 
defiance spread quickly through the South, forming the backbone 
of a larger political movement to reject Brown known as massive 
resistance.  Massive resistance, a term coined by Virginia Senator 
Harry F. Byrd in 1956, rested on the flawed assumption that the 
best method of opposing the Supreme Court was outright defiance.  
This opposition drew dubious constitutional strength from a theory 
popularized by a Virginia newspaper editor named James Jackson 
Kilpatrick in a series of editorials in November 1955 called 
interposition.  First devised by James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson in the 1790s, interposition held that individual states 
could substitute, or interpose their own interpretations of 
constitutional law for those of the Supreme Court, thereby freeing 
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them of any duty to obey legal rulings like Brown.  While such a 
position had motivated southern leaders like John C. Calhoun 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, and arguably still 
inspired southerners like Kilpatrick in the twentieth, interposition 
made little constitutional sense in 1955.  At best, it was a formal 
way of dressing groundless constitutional rebellion in legal 
language, useful mainly as a rhetorical tool for extremists to gain 
uninformed votes.51
To J.P. Coleman, massive resistance and the extremists 
who supported it posed just as much of a threat to preserving 
segregation as the outside “meddlers” who were pushing blacks to 
file ill-considered legal challenges to segregated schools.  So long 
as black activists and white extremists were allowed to operate 
freely, believed Coleman, they would jeopardize the South’s 
ability to preserve segregation.  If, on the other hand they could be 
kept in check then the federal government could be kept out of 
southern affairs, allowing the races time to separate themselves.  
Even if some blacks refused to remain in their own schools, he 
believed, they could be thwarted quietly by redrawing school 
district boundaries or even assigning students to schools according 
to factors that did not refer overtly to their color.  Such legalist 
evasions, coupled with established racial norms, would effectively 
save segregation in the state. 
To drive home the damage that extremists could cause the 
South, Coleman worked hard to remind white voters in Mississippi 
that what the South faced in the 1950s was very much like what it 
had confronted in the 1870s.  Just like during Reconstruction’s 
“dark days,” he claimed on statewide television in 1954, the 
South’s way of life was being challenged by “individuals of whom 
not a one ever lived in our state.”52  This challenge had to be met 
with the same “determination” that ex-confederates like South 
Carolina governor “Wade Hampton” exhibited during their 
opposition to Reconstruction following the Civil War.53  Though 
Hampton had himself been something of an extremist, Coleman 
focused instead on Hampton’s loyal service to the South, arguing 
that he too was deeply committed to southern traditions, arguably 
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even more so than politically irresponsible proponents of massive 
resistance.54
Determined to avoid violent defiance, Coleman came into 
direct conflict with Tom P. Brady and James O. Eastland on 
December 12, 1955, when Eastland and Brady joined Mississippi 
Congressman John Bell Williams in signing a resolution endorsing 
nullification of the Brown ruling.55  Nullification, which lacked 
any real legal basis, closely mimicked interposition, the theory 
resurrected by Virginia newspaper editor James Jackson 
Kilpatrick. 
To Coleman, it was nonsense. “You have probably noticed 
the manifesto freely issued in recent days by Judge Brady, Senator 
Eastland and Congressman Williams,” Coleman told the 
Mississippi legislature on December 15, 1955, “in which these 
men have advocated that the Legislature pass resolutions of 
nullification of the U.S. Supreme Court decision.  I am shocked 
and surprised by this proposal, because history teaches in a long 
succession of events that such efforts have always failed, and in 
failing have brought down terrible penalties upon the heads of 
those who attempted it.”56  To avoid such penalties, which 
Coleman’s study of Reconstruction made all too clear, the new 
governor advocated calm.  “What I want to do,” Coleman told the 
state’s lawmakers, “is to preserve segregation in Mississippi.  I am 
not trying to grab headlines.”57
Coleman’s mention of grabbing headlines was suggestive.  
Though leaders like Eastland, Williams and Brady all proclaimed 
that interposition was the best possible response to the Supreme 
Court, it is possible, indeed likely that they too realized it was 
constitutionally flimsy.  After all, Brady was an experienced judge 
and both Eastland and Williams were accomplished attorneys who 
had risen to the highest ranks of American government.  Their 
brazen endorsement of nullification may have had less to do with 
their belief that it would actually stop the Supreme Court than with 
a more instrumental belief that it could be used to rally white 
votes.  This was certainly true of Eastland and Williams, both of 
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whom relied on white voters to keep them in positions of power, 
and arguably Brady as well, who later confessed to being 
interested in running for governor.58
What led to such beliefs?  Why, for example, might leaders 
like Brady, Eastland, and Williams all come to think that 
extremism would win them votes, even though it had little chance 
of actually succeeding against the Supreme Court?  And how, if 
they were correct, did J.P. Coleman win the governor’s race in 
1955?  Perhaps the best answer is that popular support for defiance 
grew in direct relation to grassroots organizing by groups like the 
Citizens’ Councils, who expanded rapidly across the South from 
1956 to 1959.  The Councils, aided by extreme segregationists like 
James Jackson Kilpatrick, endorsed a program of legal defiance, or 
massive resistance that they then sold to legally unsophisticated 
voters as a more robust form of constitutionalism than Coleman’s 
placement schemes.  Indeed, prior to the rise of the Councils, 
southern voters seemed relatively ambivalent about the best means 
of dealing with Brown.  That they overwhelmingly opposed the 
ruling is relatively certain, yet many voters seemed to have been at 
least open to the idea that other means of circumventing the Court 
existed besides just defiance.  This was certainly true in 
Mississippi, as J.P. Coleman’s victory attests, despite the fact that 
it was one of the South’s most conservative, racially divided states. 
Indeed, Coleman gained a certain amount of success by 
distinguishing himself from Brady, Eastland, and Williams, 
sometimes known as the “Little Three,” instead counseling legalist 
evasion as the best means of preserving the status quo.  Afraid that 
defiance would compromise Mississippi’s ability to keep black 
children out of white schools, for example, Coleman urged his staff 
to “pour cold water on any resolution coming before the new 
legislature for purposes of nullification of the Supreme Court 
decision.”59  Though Coleman derided Brady, Eastland, and 
Williams’s means, he did not oppose their ends.  “I don’t have one 
iota of fear, he assured white Mississippians, “that we will not 
have segregation continued in this state.”60  He just did not believe 
that nullification was the way to do it.  
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M IS FOR MISSISSIPPI & MURDER 
 
To J.P. Coleman, the Little Three’s move towards 
nullification only worsened Mississippi’s reputation for racial 
extremism, an image exacerbated by the killing of Emmett Till in 
August 1955 along with a string of other murders earlier that year, 
all targeting civil rights activists.  The first of these happened in 
May, when an African American minister named George W. Lee 
was shot in his car while driving home through the small Delta 
town of Belzoni.61  Lee, a member of the NAACP, had been trying 
to register black voters in Humphreys County and had ignored 
white requests to refrain.62  Ike Shelton, the local sheriff, refused 
to charge anyone for the murder, stating that he could not tell 
whether the shotgun pellets in Lee’s face were bullets or lead 
fillings in his teeth.63  On August 13, an African American named 
Lamer Smith was killed on the lawn outside Tom P. Brady’s 
courthouse in Brookhaven.64  Smith had also been active in trying 
to register black voters.  Even though local police witnessed a 
white man covered in blood leaving the scene of the murder, they 
took days to arrest anyone.  When three men were finally brought 
before a grand jury, the jury refused to indict any of them, 
bolstering the impression that whites in Mississippi tolerated, if not 
approved, the killing of black people in the state. 65
Three weeks later, Emmett Till’s body was found.  This 
discovery, together with the shootings of Lee and Smith, inspired 
the NAACP to release a pamphlet entitled M is for Mississippi and 
Murder that called for the federal government to intervene, ending 
the violence in Mississippi.66  To fuel the fire, high ranking 
officers in the NAACP made public statements decrying 
Mississippi’s violent record. “It would appear from this lynching,” 
announced Roy Wilkins, the NAACP’s executive secretary shortly 
after the Till killing, “that the state of Mississippi has decided to 
maintain white supremacy by murdering children.  The killers of 
the boy felt free to lynch him because there is in the entire state no 
restraining influence of decency, not in the state capital, among the 
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daily newspapers, the clergy nor any segment of the so-called 
better citizens.”67   Though something of an exaggeration, Roy 
Wilkins realized, just as J.P. Coleman did, that white violence 
could be used to draw federal intervention into the South.  In fact, 
two weeks after the Little Three signed their nullification 
resolution, Wilkins wrote to every NAACP branch in the country 
suggesting that they use the Till murder to lobby Congress into 
passing legislation authorizing federal intervention in the region.  
“[P]lease write without further delay to both Senators from your 
state and to the Congressman from your district,” he urged 
NAACP branch leaders around the country, “reminding them of 
the Till murder and asking that this session of Congress pass civil 
rights bills to give the Department of Justice authority to act in 
such cases as the Till killing.”68  Wilkins’s strategy, which sought 
to use evidence of southern atrocities to lobby directly for 
congressional intervention in the South, was remarkable.  Indeed, it 
suggests that at least some strategists in the early civil rights 
movement were thinking about using white violence to coerce 
southern compliance long before the famed direct action 
campaigns in Birmingham and Selma in 1963 and 1965.  Though 
Wilkins certainly did not advocate direct action protest to provoke 
such violence, he undoubtedly saw how white extremism could 
help the black struggle.69
J.P. Coleman also recognized how extremism, particularly 
violence could help the black struggle.  In fact, as early as June 
1955 Coleman warned constituents that “Congress might be 
inclined” to pass intrusive laws “to implement the desegregation 
decision” if the South chose to pursue defiance.70  Such an 
eventuality would be disastrous, argued Coleman, given 
Congress’s far-reaching powers over federal funding, interstate 
commerce, and the jurisdictional reach of federal agents.  
Conversely, “all the Supreme Court can do,” he maintained, “is lay 
down a rule” from within the interpretation of a case, something 
that did not lend itself to particularly aggressive enforcement.71
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Roy Wilkins, perhaps even more than black legal strategists 
like Thurgood Marshall, recognized that Congress, not the Court, 
held the key to black freedom.  In fact, three weeks after the Little 
Three signed their interposition resolution, Wilkins sent Coleman a 
telegram requesting that he do more for racial justice in his state.  
The inspiration behind the message was a magazine article by 
Alabama journalist William Bradford Huie recounting shocking 
confessions by J.W. Milam and Roy Bryant to the Emmett Till 
killing, making a mockery of Mississippi’s criminal justice 
system.72  Given “the admission” of Roy Bryant and J.W. Milam, 
wrote Wilkins to Coleman, “the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People calls upon you to convene the 
grand jury of Le Flore County for the purpose of a new 
presentment of the kidnap charges against these self confessed 
criminals.”73  A new trial on the separate charge of kidnapping, not 
murder, Wilkins explained, would have far-reaching effects.  “If 
nothing is done to make them pay for at least one of their crimes,” 
lectured Wilkins, “our country will be held up for international 
ridicule.”74  That Wilkins mentioned international ridicule 
suggested that he was using international politics, backlit by the 
Cold War, as a means of pressuring Coleman into helping African 
Americans. 
Did Coleman understand, much less fear such a move?  It is 
almost certain that he did.  After all, he had confronted just such a 
threat while prosecuting Willie McGee in 1951 – even receiving 
letters from officials in China and the Soviet Union.  Now, Wilkins 
seemed to be assuming the role of the CRC by focusing on 
southern atrocities to try to force the South to change its racial 
politics.  To make matters worse, white extremists like Milam and 
Bryant seemed to be going out of their way to disgrace the state, 
further convincing Coleman of the strategic value of moderation.  
During his inaugural address on January 17, 1956, Coleman 
alluded to M is for Mississippi and Murder.  “Despite all the 
propaganda which has been fired against us,” declared the new 
governor, “the country can be assured that the white people of 
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Mississippi are not a race of Negro killers.”75  No doubt realizing 
that reporters from national newspapers like the New York Times 
and the Chicago Daily Tribune were present, which they were, 
Coleman specifically addressed audiences outside the state.  “I 
would like you, our friends outside Mississippi, to know,” he 
continued, “that the great overwhelming majority of the white 
people of Mississippi are not now guilty and never intend to be 
guilty of any murder, violence, or any other wrong-doing toward 
anyone.”76  Coleman then turned to address his constituents.  “We 
must keep cool heads and calm judgment in the face of all the 
provocation which is being hurled upon us,” he warned.77 “[W]hile 
there is no magic remedy for the Supreme Court decision there are 
multiplied means and methods, all perfectly legal, by which we can 
and will defeat integration of the races in our state.”78  Coleman’s 
allusion to multiplied means and methods, all perfectly legal, stood 
in stark contrast to Brady, Eastland, and Williams’s declaration of 
nullification, and even to his own pressured endorsement of 
interposition.  It was a call for evasion, not extremism and it 
illustrated Coleman’s conviction that the best way of preventing 
integration was through legalist means. 
Roy Wilkins took issue with Coleman’s suggestion that he 
and activists like him were using white atrocities to force political 
change, even mentioning the word “provocation.”79  Outraged that 
Coleman would try to pin racial unrest on “provocation” by civil 
rights groups, Wilkins wrote the new governor inquiring about the 
murder of an African American named Clinton Melton on 
December 3, 1955 in Glendora, Mississippi.80  According to 
Wilkins, the NAACP had purposely not intervened in the case 
precisely because it hoped that Mississippi authorities might 
prosecute the killer, Elmore Otis Kimball, who had been identified 
by three witnesses.81  Despite the absence of such NAACP 
“interference” however, an all white jury still refused to convict.82  
To Wilkins, this meant that Mississippi was “unwilling to 
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administer justice” in cases where African Americans were killed 
by whites, thereby validating the NAACP’s push for “Federal 
intervention to uphold justice.”83
Rather than respond directly to Wilkins’s threat, Coleman 
chose a more evasive tactic, actively discouraging civil rights 
activists like the NAACP leader from visiting Mississippi.  On 
April 27, 1956 for example, Coleman wired Adam Clayton Powell, 
a prominent black congressman from New York and Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., an increasingly prominent black minister in 
Montgomery, requesting that they stay out of the state.84  Citing 
his “duty” as governor of Mississippi, Coleman alerted both men 
to the fact that conditions in Mississippi were “more tranquil than 
at any time in recent months” and that their appearance in the state 
would be “a great disservice to our Negro people.”85  In a prepared 
statement issued to the public, Coleman went even further, calling 
both King and Powell “professional agitators” akin to the 
“carpetbaggers” and “scalawags” who corrupted southern politics 
after the Civil War.86  Both had been invited to speak at a meeting 
in Jackson sponsored by an organization called the Regional 
Council of Negro Leadership (RCNL).87  King, in particular, 
worried Coleman due to his charismatic leadership of a massive 
bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama that had begun in December 
1955 and was still in full swing during the spring of 1956.  Seeing 
the avalanche of negative press the boycott generated for Alabama 
authorities, not to mention the greater outpouring of sympathy it 
generated for the black struggle, Coleman recognized that a similar 
conflagration in Mississippi might compromise his plans for 
peaceful evasion of Brown.  Interestingly, both King and Powell 
complied with Coleman’s request, asserting that they had never 
planned to take up the RCNL’s invitation anyway.88  While might 
have been true, the RCNL still chafed at the governor’s move and 
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attacked him for trying to project a façade of tranquility in the 
state.  “The effort being put forth by Governor J.P. Coleman to 
give the outside world the impression that there is a tranquil state 
of race relations in Mississippi” must be challenged, lamented the 
RCNL at its annual meeting in Jackson in April.  “As long as the 
986,000 Negroes in Mississippi are denied their God given 
American rights in the field of Education, voting and justice, there 
will be no tranquil era in Mississippi.”89
J.P. Coleman sought to prove otherwise.  In order to bolster 
an image of tranquility in Mississippi, he called for measures far 
beyond polite requests that civil rights activists stay home.  Among 
these were innovations in the state’s law enforcement and criminal 
justice system.  During his inaugural address, for example, he 
promised that “the full weight of the government will unfailingly 
be used to the end that Mississippi will be a State of law and not of 
violence.”90  Acknowledging the negative implications of poor law 
enforcement like that demonstrated by the sheriffs in Belzoni and 
Brookhaven, Coleman admonished those in positions of power to 
conduct government on “a high plane of service, economy, and 
stability.”91  High enough, he continued, to “leave no doubt” that 
Mississippi was “an outstanding, safe place” where outside 
investors would feel comfortable  “to locate and operate,” and 
where all citizens would receive “fair and equitable treatment 
under fair and just laws.”92  It was a big promise, one that sought 
to reassure the nation that Mississippi was in fact committed to 
peace through the centralization law enforcement.  Coleman knew, 
for example, that one of the weakest links in Mississippi’s law 
enforcement machinery was the local discretion of elected sheriffs 
who had little interest in presenting a moderate image to the nation 
or the world, particularly when such an image did not help them in 
local reelection campaigns. 
 
 
CENTRALIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
Convinced that Mississippi needed to reign in violence and 
bolster lawfulness, Coleman made reforming the state’s criminal 
justice system a central part of his administration.  “I shall at the 
first appropriate opportunity,” he announced during his inaugural 
address, for example, “deliver a special message to the Legislature 
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on the necessity of strengthening and improving all phases of our 
law enforcement machinery.”93  Mississippi’s law enforcement 
machinery, up to that point, was controlled largely at the local 
level, which gave the state little power to prevent the type of local 
defiance dramatized in M is for Mississippi and Murder.  To 
ameliorate this, Coleman advocated several limitations on local 
power.  One was an unprecedented procedure through which 
locally appointed authorities and police could be recalled by 
popular vote.94  Thirty percent of the voters of any county could, 
under Coleman’s proposed bill, request by petition a recall election 
of a county official, while fifty-one percent could recall a police 
officer.95  Once such a recall petition was made, a Governor-
appointed Chancery Court would be assigned the duty of deciding 
whether the official or police officer should remain in office.96  By 
allowing the state to take a hand in local law enforcement, the bill 
defied what one newspaper called Mississippi’s traditional “hands 
off policy when it came to ‘interfering’ in local affairs.”97
To further control local affairs, Coleman increased state 
regulation of local Justices of the Peace.  Such justices, elected by 
county, handled the vast majority of criminal cases in Mississippi 
at the time, yet often possessed little or no legal training.  They 
became notorious in Mississippi for charging exorbitant court fees, 
as well as unreasonable fines for traffic violations and other petty 
crimes.98  Part of this stemmed from the fact that they were paid a 
percentage of the fees they charged, a situation inviting corruption.  
J.P. Coleman made it a goal of his administration to end this 
corruption and modernize the JP system.  “Justices of the peace 
who want to do right have no need to fear,” declared the Governor 
in 1956, “but if JP’s resist efforts to improve and modernize their 
offices, it could result in abolition of the JP court system, and they 
will have brought it on themselves.”99
To further limit local autonomy and centralize power, 
Coleman strengthened the state highway patrol.  Because state 
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troopers answered directly to him, they provided Coleman with a 
law enforcement mechanism capable of overriding local sheriffs 
and intervening in local affairs.  In order to expand their power, 
Coleman initiated a substantial reorganization of the patrol as well 
as an overall increase in its numbers.  To fund this increase he 
recommended and succeeded in obtaining increases in both tag and 
drivers’ license fees throughout the state.  As he explained many 
years later, his changes in the highway patrol would have direct 
implications for the relationship between Jackson and other parts 
of the state, particularly the Citizens’ Councils’ headquarters, the 
Delta.  “For years and years,” explained Coleman later, “the 
Mississippi Delta . . . was a fiefdom of its own.  They didn’t want 
anybody messing with their business; they ran their own affairs . . . 
and they just wouldn’t permit any – they wouldn’t even talk about 
having – state police.”100  The Delta’s aversion to state police 
stemmed from a remarkable state tradition of localism in law 
enforcement.  Though troopers had long existed in Mississippi, 
they lacked general jurisdiction and were limited largely to 
patrolling highways.  This meant that local law enforcement 
officers, particularly sheriffs, possessed almost complete autonomy 
in their counties, a situation that led to a type of decentralized law 
enforcement where local police could essentially decide what laws 
to enforce and what to ignore.  Because state troopers worked for 
the governor, any expansion in their jurisdiction or size meant a 
potential threat to this arrangement since they might be sent to 
rural counties to enforce state laws independent of local approval.  
This threat was exacerbated by the fact that many sheriffs made 
considerable amounts of money by agreeing to turn a blind eye to 
criminal activity, particularly violations of the state’s prohibition 
against alcohol, a practice that they did not want state troopers to 
interfere with.  To limit outside intervention and preserve their 
own autonomy, Mississippi sheriffs lobbied heavily in the state 
House and Senate, both forums where they hoped to resist any 
centralization of law enforcement statewide.101
Though omnipotent at home, rural sheriffs proved 
ineffectual in the state capitol.  Fears stirred by Brown seemed to 
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temporarily override Mississippi’s law enforcement localism, 
creating a situation in which state legislators proved willing to 
enact Coleman’s laws augmenting the authority of state police.  
This, of course, suggests that Brown did not just incite extremism, 
but galvanized southern state lawmaking, uniting legislators 
around the central goal of preserving segregation.  For southern 
governors with a strategic sensibility like Coleman, this created a 
window of opportunity to present aggressive packages of 
legislation that were then accepted with relatively little resistance.  
Though legislators still made the law, of course, Brown enabled 
Coleman to exercise a remarkable degree of political leadership 
over the legislative process.102
Enhancing the reach of Mississippi’s state troopers was not 
the only part of Coleman’s plan that he pushed through the state’s 
legislative process.   In fact, the most remarkable measure that he 
endorsed was the creation of a state agency called the Mississippi 
Sovereignty Commission.  The Sovereignty Commission, 
established by statute in 1956, was an executive agency charged 
with using “any lawful, peaceful and constitutional means” to 
prevent implementation of Brown.103  It possessed police powers 
as well as adjudicatory capabilities.  For example, members of the 
Sovereignty Commission could subpoena witnesses and also 
require production of private “books, records, papers or 
documents.”104  Refusal to produce such evidence could result in 
imprisonment.  Similarly, the commission had the power to use the 
Hinds County chancery court in Jackson “to enforce obedience to 
any process issued by it” and was further granted broad 
investigatory powers to look into the records of individuals, 
corporate entities and political groups. Finally, the Sovereignty 
Commission even possessed a propaganda wing dedicated to 
improving Mississippi’s image nationally.105
Impressive in scope, the Sovereignty Commission became 
an integral part of J.P. Coleman’s strategy for maintaining 
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segregation – and tranquility – in Mississippi.  Interestingly, it 
helped him to control both civil rights activists and white 
extremists.   In the spring of 1958, for example, the Commission 
became actively involved in thwarting a Citizens’ Council attempt 
to have NAACP officers Medgar Evers and Roy Wilkins arrested.  
On the afternoon of May 18, 1959, Evers, the head of the 
NAACP’s Mississippi branch, and Wilkins, visiting from New 
York, were scheduled to speak at a black Masonic Lodge in 
Jackson.  The speeches had been planned months in advance as 
part of a larger attempt to rally black support for civil rights in the 
state.  Prior to the commencement of the speech, Attorney General 
Joseph T. Patterson and Zack Van Landingham, a Sovereignty 
Commission investigator, drove to the Lodge “to observe just what 
appeared to be going on.”106  Once there, the Jackson Police 
Department’s Chief of Detectives Meady Pierce approached them, 
complaining that the Citizens’ Councils had attempted to sabotage 
the meeting.  “You know what some damn fools have done?” 
Pierce exclaimed to Patterson and Van Landingham, “They have 
gone and gotten out warrants for Roy Wilkins and Medgar 
Evers.”107
Upon investigation, Patterson and Van Landingham 
discovered that the Citizens’ Councils, convinced that “Governor 
Coleman and State authorities were afraid of Roy Wilkins and 
Medgar Evers,” had obtained a warrant from a sympathetic Justice 
of the Peace to arrest the two civil rights leaders.108  In an effort to 
derail the Councils’ strategy, Attorney General Patterson contacted 
Dick King, a high-ranking Council official, and warned him that 
arresting the two high-profile Civil Rights Leaders would not aid 
the cause of white supremacy in the state.  “It would be a grave 
mistake to arrest Wilkins and Evers,” Patterson told King, 
“because of the national publicity that would follow.”109  Van 
Landingham then contacted Louis Hollis, Director of the 
Mississippi Citizens’ Council, warning him that the arrests would 
be bad for Mississippi.  While Governor Coleman hurried back to 
Jackson from a graduation speech in Goodman to deal with the 
crisis, Hollis followed Van Landingham’s advice, contacted other 
influential Council members in the state and conveyed to them his 
discussion with the Sovereignty Commission.  By the time of the 
scheduled speeches, the Councils had withdrawn their warrant.110
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Not only did Coleman’s Sovereignty Commission control 
white extremists, it also curtailed civil rights activists.  One method 
that the Commission deployed to do this was police surveillance.  
To take just one example, almost one year before the Sovereignty 
Commission saved Medgar Evers from arrest, the Commission 
began tracking his movements around the state.  “At the meeting of 
the State Sovereignty Commission on November 20, 1958,” read 
the minutes of one Sovereignty Commission meeting, “Governor 
Coleman suggested that spot checks be made of the activities of 
Medgar Evers, both day and night, to determine whether he is 
violating any laws.”111  That Coleman ordered the Sovereignty 
Commission to ensnare Medgar Evers in the violation of petty laws 
yet shied away from his outright arrest at a public speech appears, 
on the surface, to be paradoxical.  Yet, it hints at the deeper logic 
behind J.P. Coleman’s larger civil rights strategy.  Afraid of 
appearing to be a racial extremist, he had no qualms about 
appearing tough on law enforcement, particularly if such 
enforcement happened to ensnare civil rights activists. 
Coleman ordered a particularly bold display of law 
enforcement power in June 1958, when an African American 
named Clennon King tried to enroll in summer school at the 
University of Mississippi.112  While King, a 37-year-old former 
professor had little trouble entering campus, he encountered 
problems when he joined the line to register.  Robert Ellis, a 
university registrar, invited King to his office and promptly asked 
him to leave.  King refused, only to find state troopers waiting for 
him inside.  The officers arrested him, carried him bodily to a 
waiting car and then drove him to headquarters where Public 
Safety Commissioner Tom Scarborough, at Coleman’s request, 
ordered King examined by psychiatrists.113  Based on the 
examination, a state judge ordered King committed to a state 
mental hospital.  Governor Coleman, who orchestrated King’s 
commitment, later told a press conference that the activist would 
either be confined to a mental hospital or tried for resisting arrest 
and disturbing the peace.114
Coleman’s neutralization of Clennon King showcased his 
penchant for shrewd state action.  While King clearly had no 
mental problems, his quick examination and commitment 
precluded events from escalating to a riot, as they did at Ole Miss 
four years later in 1962.  Of course, King’s story still made it into 
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northern newspapers like the New York Times, but it failed to make 
the first page.115  Coleman, through his deft handling of state 
police and Sovereignty Commission agents, displayed a knack for 
quietly diffusing black protest.  Interestingly, he would refine this 
ability even more as his agents undertook the manipulation of 
black leaders themselves to help prevent integration in Mississippi. 
 
 
RECRUITING BLACK INFORMANTS 
 
On May 15, 1956, J.P. Coleman declared that it was time 
for the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission to bring itself 
into “full effect and fruition” by taking two final steps towards 
expanding its power.116  Specifically, the Commission decided to 
allocate state funds to “buy information” from civil rights activists 
and, concomitantly, to hire black secret agents to serve as the 
Commission’s “eyes and ears” in African American 
communities.117   In addition to tracking civil rights activists like 
Medgar Evers through conventional police tactics, the Sovereignty 
Commission also sought black agents to guide it through black 
political networks that were otherwise hidden from white view.  
These agents were usually older, middle class African Americans 
who held prestigious positions in black colleges and schools and 
feared, correctly, that integration could lead them to lose their jobs.  
Once on the Sovereignty Commission’s payroll they performed a 
variety of tasks, among them reporting civil rights activity in their 
communities as well as intervening directly to diffuse civil rights 
protest.118
For example, on December 10, 1957, the Sovereignty 
Commission’s Public Relations Director Hall DeCell reported to 
Governor Coleman on a meeting in Clarksdale of the Regional 
Council of Negro Leadership, the same group that had invited 
Martin Luther King and Adam Clayton Powell to Jackson in 1956.  
“We had the meeting well covered with some of our Negro 
friends,” asserted DeCell, referring to black informers employed 
by the Commission, “and will have by the latter part of this week, 
a complete typewritten report on what went on.”119  That Coleman 
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was getting typewritten reports of RCNL meetings was 
remarkable.  The RCNL, unlike the NAACP, was a relatively 
isolated, local organization.  That the governor was reading their 
minutes suggests a relatively high level of both state surveillance, 
and intrusion, into black affairs.  It also helps to explain how 
Coleman knew, for example, that Martin Luther King, Jr. and 
Adam Clayton Powell were scheduled to speak in Jackson, 
prompting a hasty move by the governor to contact each leader and 
dissuade them from visiting the state. 
While legal segregation kept the races apart, Coleman’s 
Sovereignty Commission enabled him to get inside black civil 
rights circles.  Further, the type of information furnished by the 
Commission helped give Coleman a sense of what parts of the 
state might need particular attention.  In August 1956, for example, 
Coleman received assurance from a Sovereignty Commission 
agent named William Liston that whites in Yazoo City were 
working together with black agents to quell civil rights activity 
themselves, independent of state help.  For example, Liston noted 
that one black agent named Fred W. Young had called a “meeting 
of all the Negro teachers” in Yazoo City and warned them that “the 
fastest way for them to lose the proposed new Negro schools 
would be for them to engage in N.A.A.C.P. activities.” 120  That 
African Americans were being offered new schools, and that black 
agents were being used to sell such schools, helps explain the 
extent to which Coleman endorsed a moderate approach to 
resisting Brown, one that rewarded at the same time as it pressured 
blacks. 
While Coleman’s willingness to fund black schools was 
clearly designed to forestall integration, it was also indicative of a 
larger, perhaps unexpected effect of Brown.  As much as Brown 
seemed to pit the races against each other, for example, it also 
brought moderates of both races closer together, usually by 
encouraging them to meet and forge compromises.121  For 
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example, white moderates throughout Mississippi worked hard to 
form interracial organizations, or committees, precisely so that 
black and white leaders could sit down and negotiate deals in lieu 
of integrating.  One such committee in Mississippi drew attention 
to itself in the summer of 1956, for example, when Liston reported 
on civil rights in Vicksburg.  According to him, an “inter-racial 
Committee on Race Relations” composed of “outstanding and 
rational members of both races” had worked successfully through 
negotiation and mediation to “control extremists on both sides.”122  
One member of said committee, J.H. White, gained particular 
praise from Liston for his openness to negotiating with whites, a 
willingness that might have stemmed from the fact that he was also 
president of then all-black Mississippi Vocational College.123
To Roy Wilkins, over a thousand miles away in New York, 
such black cooperation was lamentable.  “Over in Soviet Russia,” 
exclaimed Wilkins during a speech on June 3, 1956, “they had a 
system of paying children to spy on their parents,” now 
Mississippi, in his opinion, was doing the same thing.124  “Spies 
will tell who smiled at a Negro yesterday,” he lamented, “or what 
Negro said he was sick of Jim Crow, or what tired Negro woman 
said she wished she did not have to stand up while white men sat in 
the bus.”125  While black collaboration clearly bothered Wilkins, 
there was not much he could do to stop it.  In fact, some NAACP 
members in Mississippi even pressured him, threatening to switch 
sides and work for whites if he did not comply with their demands.  
One such mercenary was Gus Courts, a black activist who was shot 
by a white racist in his own grocery store in Belzoni, Mississippi in 
1955.  Unable to find work, Courts accepted money from the 
NAACP in exchange for delivering speeches and testifying in 
favor of civil rights legislation in Congress.  By April 1957, 
however, that money had begun to run out, prompting Courts to 
ask Wilkins for more.  Aware of his potential value to 
segregationists, Courts threatened Wilkins that if the NAACP did 
not send him $1,500 for a new store, he would switch sides and 
work for J.P. Coleman.  “Must I go back to Mississippi, denounce 
the N.A.A.C.P. and accept the offers of the South?” Courts wrote 
Wilkins, “I could have avoided all this by accepting the offers of 
the Southern Whites but I chose to stand by the N.A.A.C.P. and its 
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program upon its promises.”126  Courts, perhaps because he was 
the victim of a relatively sensational crime, proved too valuable a 
spokesperson for the NAACP to lose. Wilkins sent him the money 
a week later.127
Roy Wilkins’s willingness to pay Gus Courts cash in 
exchange for making speeches against white southerners indicated 
the depth of his commitment to winning a constitutional struggle 
against the Mississippi Sovereignty Commission, and J.P. 
Coleman, on a playing field far removed from the federal courts.  
Though NAACP lawyers like Thurgood Marshall certainly became 
better known as crusaders for Brown, Wilkins was still very much 
involved in the fight, albeit in a more subtle type of propaganda 
struggle that involved the manipulation of hearts and minds.  The 
goal of this struggle was to build popular support, and ultimately 
congressional and executive resolve, for coercing compliance with 
Brown in the South.  The primary opponents of the NAACP in this 
struggle were southern moderates like Coleman, not white 
extremists like Eastland or Brady.  If anything, Eastland and Brady 
only helped the NAACP by discrediting the South with their 
absurd declarations of defiance against the Supreme Court, 
coupled with their ridiculous claims that integration would lead to 
mongrelization and civilizational collapse.  Rather than fear them, 
NAACP agents sought to actually increase the illusion of their 
influence.  On April 29, 1956, for example, A.M. Mackel, a 
NAACP member from Natchez, Mississippi, wrote a letter to Roy 
Wilkins suggesting that they infiltrate the Citizens’ Councils with 
agents appearing to be white extremists.  “A friend of mine,” wrote 
Mackel, “said we should infiltrate the Councils with the same type 
of propaganda they are putting on us.”128  Interestingly, Mackel 
suggested that the infiltrators pretend they were outspoken 
extremists, damaging the Councils’ image by making “a few 
‘Hitler’ speeches.”129  Though such proposals were not acted on, 
the manner in which they emerged reveal the extent to which the 
battle over Brown bled into ideological terrain.  Long before young 
black activists in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference or 
the Congress of Racial Equality used direct action to win hearts 
and minds nationally, leaders of the NAACP used other tactics, 
like the payment of black agents like Mackel and Courts, to 
achieve a similar end. 
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To the chagrin of the NAACP, established black leaders 
often refused to cooperate with NAACP plans, even petitioning to 
work for Coleman’s administration.  On November 13, 1958, for 
example, a black school supervisor named B.L. Bell wrote to 
Governor Coleman requesting employment with the Sovereignty 
Commission.130  Coleman ordered the Commission to conduct an 
investigation of Bell to determine his reliability and influence.  
This process included an interview, during which Bell “furnished 
considerable information and names of individuals in Bolivar 
County whom he stated were members of the NAACP.”131  After 
conducting his investigation, a white Sovereignty Commission 
agent concluded that hiring Bell “has some merit.”132  He 
recommended paying Bell “$50 a month for a period of 3 months,” 
noting that during this time Bell could monitor civil rights activity 
in the state, and then “furnish any worthwhile information” to the 
Commission.133
Political pragmatism, coupled with economic incentives, 
accounted for much of the Sovereignty Commission’s success in 
attracting black agents.  Informants sought money or services in 
exchange for cooperation.  A dramatic example of this occurred 
when a black man named Clyde Kennard applied for admission to 
Mississippi Southern, an all white college in Hattiesburg.  
Kennard, a former paratrooper, applied to enter the school in the 
fall of 1959.134  The Sovereignty Commission devised a variety of 
plans to thwart him, none involving dramatic confrontations or 
violence.  One such plan was a full-scale investigation of 
Kennard’s past, including anything that could be used to disqualify 
him, including bad credit, bad moral character, and criminal 
violations.  In pursuit of this end, the commission deployed 
investigators to search through Kennard’s past work record, his 
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past school records, and even vital statistics on his parents’ 
marriage.135
The Commission also recruited a taskforce of black 
ministers and educators to discourage Kennard from submitting his 
application.  As one Commission investigator wrote, “[I]t was 
suggested to these individuals that since they were leaders of their 
race in the community and since they were in favor of maintaining 
segregated schools, that it might serve a useful purpose if they 
would constitute themselves as a committee to call on Clyde 
Kennard and persuade him that it was for the best interest of all 
concerned that he withdraw and desist from filing an application 
for admission to Mississippi Southern College.”136  In exchange 
for their betrayal of Kennard, the black ministers and educators 
gave the Sovereignty Commission an implicit list of demands, not 
least of which was the construction of an all black junior college in 
Hattiesburg.  “It is interesting to note,” continued the Sovereignty 
Commission report, “that all three of the Negro educators when 
interviewed on separate occasions, brought into the conversation 
their need for a Negro Junior College in [Hattiesburg].  The 
inference was inescapable that they were attempting to bargain in a 
subtle manner.”137
One of the more skillful bargainers was J.H. White, the 
same individual who had been recommended to the commission 
for helping subvert civil rights in Vicksburg.  To avert a crisis at 
Mississippi Southern, White suggested that the Sovereignty 
Commission order the college’s president Dr. McCain to find some 
way of bringing Kennard to Jackson where, by apparent accident 
he could run into Governor Coleman.  An impromptu meeting with 
Coleman, argued White, would appease Kennard (who, according 
to White only wanted attention), especially if the Governor 
promised an all black college in Hattiesburg.138
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J.H. White’s not-so-subtle insistence on a black college in 
Hattiesburg provides a glimpse into the type of real politik that 
permeated race relations in Mississippi in the 1950s.  Rather than 
unsuspecting Uncle Toms, the black employees of the Sovereignty 
Commission banked on the hope that by aligning themselves with 
the state they could preserve their jobs as well as gain benefits for 
both themselves and the black community.  The NAACP, to many 
of them, was an alien, arguably even reckless organization.  Not 
only did it risk provoking a white crackdown, but it also 
represented a challenge to local black power.  Instead of embracing 
the civil rights organization, at least some black leaders opted to go 
around it, engaging in accommodation with white authorities. 
Precisely because he was willing to engage in 
accommodation, Coleman’s extensive use of black informers 
helped him preempt direct action protest and arguably subvert civil 
rights activism in the state.  At the very least, it helped him pierce 
the otherwise opaque veil that hid black political organizing from 
white officials.  Black agents became the state’s eyes and ears, 
enabling Coleman and his Sovereignty Commission to intervene 
directly in the lives of local people engaged in political protest at 
the grassroots level. 
Of course, violence remained a constant threat to black 
activism in Mississippi.  Yet, as activists-for-hire like Gus Courts 
illustrate, white violence had a certain perverse currency in the 
civil rights world.  While it clearly threatened black lives, it also 
helped the black cause, providing the NAACP with clear evidence 
that segregation was far from the system of “peaceable” 
government that J.P. Coleman tried to project.  Interestingly, this 
led Coleman to rail against the manner in which the NAACP 
paraded victims of white violence like Courts around the country, 
trying to win sympathy for the black cause.  In fact, in March 
1957, Coleman even traveled to Washington to testify against 
Wilkins before a United States Senate Subcommittee.  The 
occasion for the testimony was a civil rights bill, precisely the kind 
of federal intervention that Coleman had feared might happen if 
the South did not feign compliance with Brown. 
Committed to equating Mississippi with Murder, Roy 
Wilkins told the Senate Subcommittee how Gus Courts had been 
“shot and seriously wounded” by a white man in his own store in 
Belzoni, Mississippi, simply for trying to vote.139   Such acts of 
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racial violence, lamented Wilkins, were not being solved by local 
authorities and required federal action.  Coleman, who had of 
course been trying to improve Mississippi’s criminal justice system 
precisely to avoid such eventualities, testified that accounts of 
racial violence in Mississippi, including Courts’s shooting, were 
exaggerated.140  Complaining that Mississippi had become a 
“whipping boy,” Coleman told the Subcommittee that only four 
African Americans were killed by whites in 1955, while one 
hundred fifty-nine blacks “killed each other.”141  White 
Mississippians, he testified, “do not deserve a blanket indictment 
just because there were 4 Negroes killed by the whites in that State 
in 1955, while the Negroes were busily engaged in killing 159 of 
their own number.”142  Coleman’s message tried to downplay the 
rate of racially motivated white on black murders in the state by 
emphasizing black on black crime.  This emphasis on black 
criminality represented a new way of deflecting attention from 
racially motivated killings, not to mention the shortcomings of 
local law enforcement.  Of course, Coleman did not mention that 
he was, at that very moment, engaged in the process of trying to 
improve such law enforcement.  Perhaps he felt that such a 
concession would lend credence to Wilkins’s point.  Instead, he 
attacked the manner in which the NAACP used white on black 
killings as chess pieces in “national politics.”143  Meanwhile, he 
blasted Wilkins for not mentioning black on black murders, 
presumably because they were not as politically relevant.144  
Trying to paint Wilkins as a propagandist, Coleman struggled to 
reassure the Subcommittee that federal legislation would not “aid 
the Negro” at all, so much as become a “continuous source of 
agitation, uproar, tumult, and domestic discord.”145  Here we catch 
a glimpse of the manner in which Coleman perceived civil rights 
gains to jeopardize larger state interests, most notably the 
preservation of peace and tranquility.  Here also we see evidence 
of the manner in which Coleman and Wilkins fought publicly over 
whether federal intervention should be increased in the state, long 
before the direct action campaigns of 1963 and 1965. 
Despite his best efforts, Coleman’s testimony did not 
prevent the enactment of a 1957 Civil Rights Act.  Desperate to get 
some kind of civil rights legislation passed, Lyndon Johnson, with 
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an eye the Presidency, made a series of compromises to push the 
bill through.  Though weakened by concessions, the act reaffirmed 
Coleman’s conviction that white violence could be used 
strategically by civil rights groups to win more robust federal 
enforcement of Brown. 
 
 
 
 
MACK CHARLES PARKER 
 
In April 1959, during Coleman’s final year in office, an 
African American named Mack Charles Parker was kidnapped 
from jail in Poplarville, tortured, killed and left floating in the 
Pearl River.  Four years had passed since the lynching of Emmett 
Till and, although there had been a lull in racial violence, Parker’s 
murder stirred old fears, particularly in J.P. Coleman.146  To the 
governor, Parker’s murder created yet another opportunity for civil 
rights groups like the NAACP to generate negative propaganda 
favoring more aggressive federal legislation in the South.  Already, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee was conducting hearings on a 
second proposed civil rights bill – one that Coleman wanted 
desperately to stop.  Parker’s murder, Coleman feared, would add 
momentum to the bill, particularly because it involved the flagrant 
kidnapping of a prisoner from a county jail.  This brazen act of 
defiance, Coleman feared, would bolster longstanding NAACP 
claims that racial violence was tacitly sanctioned by southern state 
officials, a claim that, if true, bolstered the case for federal 
intervention in the region. 
Coleman also feared that Parker’s killing could destabilize 
a precarious equilibrium between moderate strategies of resistance 
to Brown and the Supreme Court.  Since the murder of Emmett 
Till, for example, there had not been one case of integration in the 
state.  In fact, in 1958 the Supreme Court had even invalidated 
massive resistance and tentatively endorsed pupil placement, two 
developments that boded well for Coleman’s moderate 
approach.147  Of course, if the Court began to suspect that national 
support for aggressive enforcement of civil rights in Mississippi 
was growing, then it might feel pressure to revisit placement plans 
and perhaps even invalidate them.  Coleman, naturally, did not 
want this to happen.  In many ways, he stood on the verge of 
victory over both the NAACP and the Citizens’ Councils, a 
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position that drove him to take a particularly adamant stance 
against the vigilante killing of Mack Charles Parker.148
In a controversial move that sought to preempt the 
NAACP’s demands for federal intervention in the South, Coleman 
requested that the federal government intervene in the case, even 
inviting the FBI to investigate the Parker kidnapping and murder.  
He also wrote a letter to southern governors asking them to join 
him in a conference to “come up with the best possible solution” 
for preventing similar acts of racial violence in the future.149  Such 
a meeting, he hoped, would send a clear message to the country 
that southern officials did not endorse racial violence, hopefully 
deflecting any negative publicity created by the crime. 
Interestingly, southern governors disagreed over whether 
such a stance was necessary.  Some, like Virginia Governor 
Lindsay Almond supported Coleman’s proposal.  “I share your 
view,” wrote Almond, “that the time is now for the Governors of 
the southern states to sit down in conference and discuss this 
matter, resolving our views to the end that law and order shall and 
must prevail throughout the Southland.”150  Other governors, 
however, declined.  “Without second, sober thought,” noted South 
Carolina Governor Ernest F. Hollings, “my immediate reaction is 
‘no.’”151  According to Hollings, the furor over the Parker killing 
was “not near so bad as your letter indicates” and a top level 
meeting of southern governors would only “give credence” to 
allegations by civil rights groups like the NAACP that “something 
really is wrong with the South.”152
Hollings’s response was arguably naïve.  By refusing to 
meet, he and other governors were probably only giving the 
NAACP more opportunities to make the South look recalcitrant.  
Of course, not all southern governors understood as well as 
Coleman just how determined black activists were to use white 
violence to their own advantage.  In fact, the divergence of opinion 
between Hollings and Almond was indicative of a larger rift 
forming between southern leaders at the time.  To most, like 
Almond, the days of massive resistance were over and a new era of 
resistance was beginning, one in which the South needed to pursue 
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legalist evasion, meanwhile taking aggressive action to control 
racial violence and project a positive national image.  To others, 
however, defiance was still desirable, if for no other reason than it 
won votes.  Hollings, for example, had just won a battle against 
University of South Carolina president Donald Russell in 1958 
precisely by blasting him for being soft on segregation.153  Now, 
he made a point to reject Coleman’s meeting, perhaps fearing that 
it could be taken as a concession to the NAACP. 
Disappointed, Coleman traveled to Washington to testify 
against the second federal civil rights bill in three years, 
meanwhile finding himself bombarded by questions about Mack 
Charles Parker.  “How [did] they get the key?” asked Colorado 
Senator John A. Carroll, referring to the manner in which the mob 
gained access to the prisoner, “Was there a conspiracy on the part 
of the bailiff or the jailers?”154  H. Slayman, Jr., the 
subcommittee’s chief counsel, asked Coleman why a grand jury 
hearing to indict the suspects would not be held until November, a 
delay that Coleman attributed to scheduling.  Questions continued, 
revolving around black voting rights, black rights to jury trials, and 
even whether the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission was 
involved.  Coleman tried desperately to bring the focus of the 
committee back to the proposed civil rights bill, but with little 
success.  He ended up making a somewhat futile reference to the 
degree of support that he had received among African Americans 
in Mississippi for the public schools he had built – a non sequitur 
that had little to do with the subcommittee’s main topic of 
interest.155
Despite frustrations like the one he encountered in 
Washington in May 1959, J.P. Coleman’s four years in office 
proved remarkably successful.  He managed to push key pieces of 
legislation through the Mississippi House and Senate, increasing 
the centralized power of the state’s law enforcement capabilities, 
meanwhile providing local officials with opportunities to keep 
black children out of white schools.  Coleman also enjoyed a 
considerable amount of success in neutralizing potentially 
combustible racial protests.  He subverted Clyde Kennard and 
Clennon King, both applicants to Mississippi Universities who 
could arguably have triggered riots.  He also worked hard to keep 
outside activists like Martin Luther King, Jr. out of the state, to buy 
information, and to rein in local sheriffs and justices of the peace. 
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Perhaps Coleman’s biggest failure lay in his inability to 
retain the confidence of white voters.  Despite the many 
accomplishments of his administration, white voters replaced him 
with an outspoken segregationist and Citizens’ Councils member 
named Ross Barnett in 1960.156  While Barnett would go on to 
obscure many of the gains that Coleman made by fueling both 
violence and extremism in the state, he would only survive one 
term.157  Indeed, as the next section will show, Coleman would 
have the final say when his old friend Lyndon Johnson appointed 
him to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1965.  
 
 
SHAVED HEAD & MOONSHINE 
 
 Only weeks after President Johnson signed a historic 
Voting Rights Act into law in August 1965, he appointed J.P. 
Coleman to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.  At the time, the 
Fifth Circuit had become celebrated for pro-civil rights opinions 
thanks to Republican Judges John Minor Wisdom and Elbert 
Tuttle.  Tuttle had even confronted allegations of corruption for 
assigning civil rights cases to liberal judges, meanwhile keeping 
them out of the hands of reactionaries like Mississippi Judge Ben 
Cameron.  In the spring of 1965 Cameron died, leaving a seat on 
the court open.  While Johnson could theoretically have appointed 
anyone he wanted to the court, including a liberal on civil rights 
issues, he chose Coleman. 
 Why?  Perhaps the best reason was electoral politics.  
Coleman had endorsed Johnson in 1964 and both Johnson and 
Kennedy in the 1960 presidential elections.  He also enjoyed the 
endorsement of powerful southern congressional leaders like 
Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland, who put any disagreement 
that he might have had with Coleman on hold.  Even Robert 
Kennedy, who knew that Coleman had helped elect his brother 
president, lobbied for the former Mississippi Governor.  Finally, 
Johnson, who at that point was still considering a second bid for 
the Presidency in 1968, was arguably reluctant to appoint a liberal 
to the Fifth Circuit, knowing that such a decision might jeopardize 
his chances of winning southern support at the polls. 
Not surprisingly, Coleman’s appointment, a fairly bold 
move considering his segregationist credentials, proved 
controversial.  During two days of hearings before a special 
subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, opponents to 
Coleman’s nomination presented a litany of reasons why he should 
not be appointed to the federal judiciary.  To take just a few 
                                                 
156 BLACK, GOVERNORS, supra note 153, at 63-5. 
157 Id.  
 38
examples, John Conyers, an African American representative from 
Michigan, testified against Coleman, calling him a “calculated 
legal technician” who had manipulated “the judicial process in 
order to protect a racist social order” in Mississippi.158  John 
Lewis, Chairman of the Student Non-violent Coordinating 
Committee, or SNCC, called Coleman’s appointment “an affront 
and an insult” to African Americans.159  Even Martin Luther King, 
Jr. prepared a statement in opposition to Coleman’s nomination, 
noting that the Fifth Circuit had “been the major constitutional 
body to which Negroes might turn in the South” and that 
appointing Coleman to the court would be a setback for the 
movement.160  It would be “a great tragedy” to put Coleman on the 
Fifth Circuit, argued King, particularly given the type of politics 
“practiced by Gov. Coleman during his years as the architect of 
Mississippi’s plans to circumvent the orders of the very Court to 
which he now seeks appointment.”161
Despite King’s protests, Coleman won Senate approval and 
used his new position on the Fifth Circuit to continue the trajectory 
that he had begun as governor, limiting violence and improving 
legal process.162  In a consolidation of cases decided in October 
1966, Coleman voted to allow civil rights activists facing trial in 
Mississippi a chance to present evidence in federal district court to 
the effect that their arrests had been racially motivated.  If they 
could prove this was the case, held Coleman, then they should be 
released.163 Four months later, Coleman decided two cases, one in 
which members of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party 
(MFDP) had been arrested for distributing leaflets in violation of 
an anti-leafleting ordinance and another in which MFDP members 
had been arrested for marching in violation of traffic regulations.  
In both cases, Coleman ruled the ordinances unconstitutionally 
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vague, particularly for the manner in which they threatened free 
speech.164  Not long thereafter, Coleman confronted an appeal by 
William Eaton and Collie Wilkins, Jr., two white Alabamans found 
guilty of murdering Viola Liuzzo, a white mother of five who had 
traveled south to participate in a massive civil rights march from 
Selma to Montgomery.165  Rejecting their argument that they 
should have been tried in state and not federal court, Coleman read 
into their crime a deprivation of Luizzo’s right to participate in 
federal elections thereby securing their convictions.166
Such rulings coincided nicely with Coleman’s longstanding 
interest in controlling extremism, curtailing violence, and 
improving legal process.  They also set the stage for a series of 
rulings that would gradually align federal law against civil rights 
demonstrators.  In May 1969, for example, Coleman wrote the 
majority opinion in a case brought by black demonstrators arrested 
for picketing in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.  Specifically, the 
demonstrators appealed an injunction, issued by a district judge 
and outspoken segregationist named Harold Cox, which allowed 
the demonstrators to picket, but limited them to six per location, 
demanded they remain at least five feet apart, and required them to 
remain absolutely silent.167  Coleman, upon reviewing the record, 
determined that the picketers were in fact attempting to provoke 
violence by singing “freedom songs” that included “words of a 
generally threatening nature.”168  Noting that the Constitution 
prohibited the state from silencing protesters completely, however, 
Coleman modified the injunction to prohibit speech “clearly 
calculated to provoke a breach of peace by others.”169
While at first glance a relatively innocuous holding, 
Coleman’s decision to sustain Cox’s injunction did at least two 
things.  One, it muted civil rights protest by lowering the number 
of street protesters that could lawfully picket a business to six, a 
relatively small number.  Two, it granted law enforcement a 
relatively broad amount of discretion in determining what was and 
was not “calculated to provoke a breach of peace.”  Given that so 
much of civil rights movement activity had attempted to provoke 
breaches of the peace in 1963, 1964 and 1965, this suggests that 
Coleman was joining other conservative judges, like Cox, to 
discourage such activity.  While certainly not an absolute 
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endorsement of Cox’s rather draconian order, it arguably indicated 
a move to shorten the leash, if you will, on demonstrators.170
Coleman shortened the leash even further in August 1970.  
That month, Coleman voted against the family of Benjamin 
Brown, a SNCC activist who had been shot and killed when police 
fired into a crowd of demonstrators in Jackson.  Unsympathetic to 
the Browns’ claim that they should have been allowed access to 
the police files in the case, Coleman argued that it was a “favorite 
ploy” of the “law violator” to sue police on “some pretext or 
another.”171  Downplaying the fact that Brown had been brutally 
killed for what appeared to be no good reason, Coleman sided 
firmly with law enforcement, arguing that “fishing” expeditions 
into police files should not be allowed, lest they undermine the 
“judicial process.”172
Two weeks later, Coleman ruled against another civil rights 
activist in Louisiana who was charged with battery and requested 
removal from state to federal court.  The facts of this case were 
particularly remarkable.  Sometime on the evening of July 28, 
1966, an African American activist named Zelma Wyche led a 
group of over fifty blacks, some of them armed, to a truck stop in 
Tallulah, Louisiana to investigate a report that the café had denied 
service to a black patron.173   Upon arriving at the café, Wyche 
demanded that the manager be sent for.  After a patron suggested 
that Wyche look for the manager himself, the activist retorted 
“What is it to you?” and then asked the patron “Do you want your 
ass whipped?”174  When the patron tried to leave, Wyche gave two 
shrill whistles, prompting several members of the black entourage 
to attack the customer.  Only when another white customer 
produced a shotgun did the attackers desist.175
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To Coleman, this type of aggressive civil rights vigilantism 
was completely unacceptable.  In his dissenting opinion, Coleman 
argued that Wyche was not engaged in protected activity and 
should not have been allowed to remove his case to federal court.  
Yet, the majority disagreed, granting Wyche a hearing at the 
federal district level to determine whether his battery charge 
should in fact have been removed to federal court under the theory 
that he had been engaged in constitutionally protected activity.  
Lamenting the ruling, Coleman noted that the majority had 
inflicted “a Sunday punch” on the “sagging ability of local 
governments to enforce their laws against crimes of violence.”176
Two years after being outvoted in Wyche, Coleman gained 
the upper hand.  In January 1972, he delivered a majority opinion 
that challenged the ability of nonviolent protesters to have their 
cases removed from state to federal court, thereby undermining the 
expanded removal remedy that the Fifth Circuit had worked hard 
to develop in the 1960s.177  Specifically, Coleman confronted an 
appeal from a group of student activists who had been commuting 
regularly to Mendenhall, Mississippi from Jackson in January and 
February of 1970 to participate in marches and demonstrations.178  
One night after a demonstration, the appellants were pulled over by 
state troopers and arrested for reckless driving.  The students were 
then taken to the local jail, where troopers and county police 
shaved the leader’s head and poured moonshine on his scalp.  
Though the act drew no blood and left no scar, it sent the victim 
into fits of pain, torturing him.   
Coleman showed little interest.  While considerable 
evidence existed to suggest that the troopers had engaged in torture 
to discourage civil rights, Coleman went out of his way to defend 
the police.  According to him, the fact that the demonstrations were 
in one county and the arrest in another, coupled with police 
testimony that the driver had been veering between lanes, 
suggested that there was no relation between the demonstrations 
and the arrests.  Because the arrests were not designed to interfere 
with constitutional rights, he continued, the case should be 
remanded to state court.179
Judge John R. Brown, in a vigorous one hundred forty-page 
dissent disagreed, warning that Coleman’s opinion threatened not 
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only to limit the removal remedy, but also to excuse a blatant 
attempt to prevent citizens from exercising their constitutional 
rights.  Noting that the state troopers had been present at the 
demonstration, had taken photographs of the activists, and had 
later followed the van out of Mendenhall, Brown concluded that 
the true motivation behind the arrest was to prevent further 
demonstrations, not apprehend reckless drivers.  Bolstering this 
conclusion, argued Brown, was the torture of the leader, along with 
evidence that the state troopers had warned him about participating 
in civil rights activities in Mendenhall before, promising that they 
were “not going to take anymore of this civil rights stuff.”180  All 
of these factors combined, concluded Brown, to show that both the 
arrests and the state prosecution were a “classic example of the 
misuse of State criminal procedures for the sole purpose of 
intimidating the exercise of equal civil rights.”181
Coleman, relying heavily on the testimony of the state 
troopers involved, stood fast.  To him, the relatively obvious 
targeting of the activists by the police was less important than the 
lawlessness that the activists themselves were engaged in.  Shifting 
attention from the police to the activists and their friends, Coleman 
focused on the fact that two acquaintances of the demonstrators, 
both ministers, had arrived at the jail where the activists were 
being held with weapons in their car, pleading for their release.  
Though the ministers left their weapons as they entered the station, 
an altercation ensued between them and the police, during which a 
sheriff was allegedly punched in the face.  To Coleman, this type 
of aggressive civil rights “activism” was unacceptable.  “[W]e are 
under no duty,” he wrote, “to extend some kind of left handed 
judicial approval to the practice of carrying an arsenal of weapons 
on night time visits to jails or police stations, even if the possession 
of such weapons is otherwise lawful.”182
Though the visit by the two ministers to the jail arguably 
had nothing to do with the viability of the constitutional claims of 
the arrested students, Coleman’s holding reflected a new angle of 
attack, if you will, against direct action protest.  Instead of a 
decision about civil rights, Coleman transformed his opinion into a 
defense of law enforcement.  According to him, state police had 
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not gone after civil rights activists but rather, civil rights protesters 
had sent armed emissaries after the police.183
Perhaps surprisingly, Coleman won support for this 
position.  Twelve months after overruling Judge Brown, he 
marshaled a majority en banc opinion on the same case over the 
protests of John Minor Wisdom.184  While Wisdom joined Brown 
in arguing for a broad reading of the removal remedy, the en banc 
majority affirmed Coleman’s holding that the measure did not 
allow the federal government to intervene when law enforcement 
was “lawfully carrying out” its duties.185  Although there was 
substantial evidence to suggest that this was not happening, as 
illustrated by the torture of the Jackson civil rights leader, the 
majority joined Coleman in rejecting the compensatory claims of 
the demonstrators.186  Though briefly overshadowed by state 
politics, Coleman’s commitment to ending public violence and 
bolstering law enforcement had eventually taken hold in the 
federal courts.  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
Several factors contributed to the ascendance of Coleman’s 
law enforcement vision.  One was Coleman’s ability to reframe 
resistance to civil rights in a racially neutral manner, something 
that he had begun to do while governor of Mississippi in the 1950s.  
Another was a dramatic change in how those who challenged racial 
norms were handled in the Deep South  Taking the Mendenhall 
case as an example, the act of applying alcohol to a newly shaved 
head, though excruciating, lacked the potential to generate the kind 
of outrage that Emmett Till’s mangled corpse had in 1955. This 
explains Coleman’s willingness to reject the claims of the 
Mendenhall demonstrators.  He had worked hard to modernize law 
enforcement in Mississippi precisely because he understood how 
acts of public violence could jeopardize southern interests.  
Bloodless acts of private violence, on the other hand, particularly 
those that caused no “spectacle” and made no mark, left Coleman 
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indifferent.187  So long as torturers devised traceless methods of 
administering pain, torture could continue.   
While it would be a mistake to equate Mississippi with the 
rest of the South, Coleman endorsed reforms that dramatically 
altered the balance of power in his state, removing autonomy from 
local officials and granting it to centralized authorities.  To take 
just a few examples, he expanded the jurisdiction and reach of state 
police, improved information gathering, and extended appellate 
review to local justices of the peace.  While Coleman’s ultimate 
goal was to facilitate evasion of Brown, many of these reforms had 
a positive effect on African Americans who had long known the 
state to be complicit in public torture and killing.   
 Not just a representative of Mississippi, J.P. Coleman 
ended up having an influence on much of the region as a Fifth 
Circuit Judge.  At the time, the Fifth Circuit controlled most of the 
Deep South, including Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, 
Florida, and Texas.188  As an appellate judge, Coleman punished 
public killers like the murderers of Viola Liuzzo but not police 
who pursued more “gentle” forms of punishment, like the shaving 
of the activist in Mendenhall.189  In so doing, Coleman sent a 
relatively clear message that the era of public torture and murder 
for racial transgressions had come to an end.  Though he was 
certainly not alone in drawing the curtain on lynching, his role as 
governor of one of the South’s most recalcitrant states during the 
height of massive resistance, coupled with his role on the Fifth 
Circuit in the 1970s and 80s, make him a particularly compelling 
lens through which to view transformations in how the South dealt 
with race.  Many of his reforms live on in Mississippi today, just as 
his judicial opinions remain a part of federal law.  Coleman’s story 
helps show how southern attitudes towards the “spectacle of the 
scaffold” evolved relatively quickly in the aftermath of Brown and 
the murder of Emmett Till.190   
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